What if if I told you that another General
in 1940 first used the same tactic in the Desert that Rommel would use later to great
success? Well, it’s true, and surprisingly that General was British and ended up defeating
an Italian Army of 150,000 strong with a force of 30,000. So well done General O’Connor This is Operation Compass 1940 – 41. Let’s look at the strategic picture of 1940.
Mussolini declares war on Britain and France on June 10th 1940, shortly before the Germans
beat the French. With Italy’s colonies in East Africa isolated, Mussolini orders the
Italian Army in Libya to invade Egypt, a British colony. Egypt is vitally important to the
British Empire in 1940. It is the link between the home islands, the Middle East and India.
If Britain loses Egypt and the Suez canal, the Royal Navy and supply convoys between
Britain and her colonies will have to travel much further, around the southern tip of Africa
– a journey that would take three months to complete. The Royal Navy also wants to battle
the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean, and would find herself in desperate waters if
Egypt is lost. For Italy, the conquest of Egypt would enable
her to link with her colonies in East Africa, and also strike into the Middle East, where
British Oil could be seized. It would also secure her the Mediterranean, which Mussolini
sees as the Italian Lake needed for the creation of his second Roman Empire. To forge this
empire, the 10th Army under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani is to strike from Libya into Egypt
and inflict a crushing defeat on the British. The commanders on both sides of this conflict
are most interesting. Names like Rommel and Montgomery
have left a lasting impression in history. But the early commanders are almost unknown.
Yet these commanders proved to be both the best and the worst at fighting a new type
of warfare and shouldn’t be forgotten. They set the stage for what was to come later,
and nurtured the formations that gained international fame. Like, the Desert Rats. Just to point
out that although 7th Armoured was known as the Desert Rats at this time, they didn’t
get the insignia shown here until 1944. But to distinguish the unit from others and for
simplicity reasons we’ll keep it like this. The commander of Italian 10th Army was Commander
in Chief Italo Balbo, who had marched on Rome with Mussolini, and had helped build the Italian
Royal air force, but was also shot down by his own anti-aircraft batteries. So with
the death of Balbo, Marshal Graziani is placed in command of 10th Army. Known as the “Butcher
of Ethiopia”, his orders saw the massacre of thirty thousand Ethiopians in 1937. He
also was the Italian General who help create the Italian armoured warfare doctrine of 1938,
known as the War of Rapid Decision. This doctrine promoted fast moving combined arms warfare
– with the use of tanks, motorized infantry, paratroopers, and regular units – and was
gained from experience in the Spanish Civil War, and Graziani’s motorized and armoured
thrusts in Ethiopia in 1937. Graziani had used armoured and motorised troops to good
effect in Ethiopia. Would he use the same tactics again in North Africa? Totalling 150,000 men in ten divisions, the
10th Army outnumbers the British 5 to 1, with the two British divisions in the area (the
7th Armoured Division and the Indian 4th Infantry Division) only totalling around 31,000 men.
On paper the Italians have the advantage, but Graziani knows that the 10th Army is completely
unprepared to invade Egypt and needs at the very least a few months to prepare for this
mammoth undertaking. He’s therefore reluctant to follow his orders and delays for as long
as he can to prepare his army for an offensive he doesn’t believe can succeed. Graziani
is summoned to Rome to explain himself to to an enraged Mussolini. El Duce believes the
British would be defeated by the Germans soon, as Operation Sealion and the invasion of the
British Isles is being prepared. He thinks he might not have time to conquer all of Egypt,
but he knows that a victory in the desert would give him much more bargaining power
at the conference table. He therefore tells Graziani that “I am only asking you to attack
the British forces facing you”. Graziani thinks it best to wait until the British are
defeated at Sealion before attacking in Egypt, thinking their morale would collapse and victory
would be assured. Of course, Sealion doesn’t happen, but that was Graziani’s hope. Effectively, Italy’s strategy at this stage
was to engage British forces. If that proved successful, maybe taking the Suez canal and
linking up with Italian forces in Ethiopia would be possible. There was no strategy really
involved. It didn’t go beyond that. And it shouldn’t be surprising then that the
British commanders took the initiative. Now there’s two British commanders who stand
out at this stage. You have General O’Connor of the Western Desert Force, basically in
command of the units in Western Egypt. And you have General Archibald Wavell, Commander
in Chief of the Middle East. Let’s start with O’Connor. General O’Connor arrived from Palestine
in June 1940, shortly after Italy’s declaration of war. Low-key, uncaring for publicity and
gaining complete confidence in his men, it was O’Connor who set out to study the ground
before him so thoroughly, venturing out personally towards Italian lines to the point that his
junior commanders worried about his safety. He realised early on that logistics would
make or break the campaign in the desert. Every drop of water or fuel, let alone every
bullet, had to travel on desert roads and along one railway line, which ended at Mersa
Matruh. He quickly came to the conclusion that supply trucks were vital, and at this
stage in the war, there simply weren’t enough to go around to sustain his forces on the offensive.
His plan at this stage was to hit the Italians with small attacks across the border, raiding
several forts and towns just inside the Libyan frontier. The aim of these raids is to bluff
the Italians into thinking his force was larger than it actually is, and maybe cause them
some reluctance to advance. In the first few days after the declaration of war, the 11th
Hussars (a regiment from 7th Armoured Division) crossed the Libyan frontier and ambushed Italian
convoys, bringing back prisoners and scouting Italian positions. This period also sees the
first tank on tank action of the North African Campaign. Six days after declaring war, an
Italian armoured battalion moved from Gabr Saleh towards Sidi Omar-Ridotta Capuzzo – this area – but British armoured cars engaged the Italian forces, and the Italian commander, Colonel
D’Avanzo – I’m going to struggle with this – formed his force into a defensive square, reminiscent of Napoleonic era anti-cavalry
squares. The British, reinforced by light and medium tanks, defeated a charge from Italian
tanks who advanced in the open without infantry or artillery support, before circling and
engaging the Italian square. The Italians had no anti-tank guns, and their antiquated
(mostly Austrian) artillery guns weren’t very effective. The result – their square
broke and the Italians fled. Thus, the Italians lost a portion of their tank and mechanized
units early in the campaign. On the 14th, the whole of 4th Armoured brigade (again,
part of 7th Armoured Division) move forwards and take the Italian border posts of Fort
Maddalena and Fort Capuzzo. During this raid 11th Hussars capture General Lastucci, Engineer
in Chief of the 10th Army, who had the plans for the defence of the coastal city of Bardia
with him. All but one of these raids are victories for the British. During these raids, the British reconnaissance
indicates that the Italians were reinforcing the 10th Army and bringing fresh units to
the border, so O’Connor decides to pull most of 7th Armoured Division back to Mersa
Matruh to form a counter-attacking force should the Italians make it that far. In the meantime,
7th Armoured Division’s Support Group, commanded by Brigadier Gott, was to continue to perform
reconnaissance and to harass and delay the Italians if and when they cross the border. And the Italians would cross the border. Operazione
E was the Italian plan for the Invasion of Egypt. Now, you might recall that Graziani
came up with the concept of War of Rapid Decision, Italy’s armoured warfare doctrine. Graziani
had a choice then, he could either deploy his forces en masse and march across the desert
with all his infantry in a huge formation and hope to overwhelm the small British forces
at the border. Or he could deploy his armoured and motorised units (he had enough trucks
to motorise a couple infantry divisions) and rapidly strike across the border in the same
fashion as a German blitzkrieg. The benefit of this attack would be that his logistics
wouldn’t be as strained as they would be if they attacked en masse, because there’s
less fuel and less mouths to feed. And Graziani, having experienced successful use of motorised and
armoured formations in the Ethiopian conflict and being the person who had developed the
doctrine of War of Rapid Decision, decided to attack en masse. This decision is perhaps
the most shocking of any made by the Italians up to this point, apart from declaring war
in the first place. The Italians organised their lines so that
most of the medium tanks they had were grouped into one formation – the Maletti group… named after it’s commander, Maletti. This group is supported by the unmotorised Libyan divisions, all of whom were on the coast.
The 62nd Marmarica and 63rd Cirene were in the area ready to support and the 4th Blackshirt
and the 64th Catanzaro were in reserve near Tobruk. On the 13th September 1940, the Italians
advance, retaking Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena and cross the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. But
not all of them. Only 80,000 cross the border, and most of these have to march on foot through
the desert with little water, training or equipment. A large portion of the Italian
units are low quality Libyan colonial units who weren’t particularly willing to fight
against a foreign power for a foreign power. But advance they did, at 12 miles a day. Now
the Maletti group, with all the Medium Italian tanks, sets off to outflank the British…
and gets lost. The Italian air force has to find it, and Graziani then prevents the Maletti
group from operating independently from the rest of 10th Army. The Maletti group leads
the way but are followed by a mass of foot soldiers. And so 10th Army’s crawl continues.
The British harass the Italians, causing serious losses as the Italians decide to advance in
a column protected only by motorcyclists on the flanks. After four days, the Italians
triumphantly march into Sidi Barrani, fifty miles into Egypt, where they have to stop. Fifty
miles. They can physically go no further. If they were to go forwards, their logistics
chain wouldn’t be able to keep up and they’d run out of supplies. Yes, the Italian invasion
of Egypt is stopped, not by the British, but by the unpreparedness of the Italian forces
and their inability to supply their men. Graziani can do little except dig in. The
10th Army constructs a line of fortified camps in the desert, running down fifty miles from
the Mediterranean. And that is it. This is the grand conquest of Egypt by the Italians. O’Connor is annoyed that the Italians
only got this far. ‘We hoped he would try and advance to the neighbourhood of Matruh,
as we had prepared a full-dress counter-stroke with all our armour. We worked this out on
the ground, and I was greatly disappointed that he never came far enough to put it into
execution.’ And now the waiting began. Both sides unable
or unwilling to do anything but sit there and stare at each other. And the waiting continued.
And continued. And continued. For months, neither side did anything. The Italians couldn’t
advance. They’d outstretched their supply lines, and were now firmly dug in defensive
positions which they were happily reinforcing with minefields, hospitals, sleeping quarters
and a host of other lavish luxuries With time now on their side, Churchill orders 57 new tanks, as well as a host of reinforcements
from New Zealand and Australia to boost British forces in Egypt. The 57 new tanks are Matilda II
heavy tanks – known as the “I” tanks, assigned to 7th Royal Tank Regiment. But the British had several other advantages
over their Italian adversaries, which General Wavell now exploited. He had done so little
in the preceding months that almost everyone had given up guessing when he might attack,
if at all. There were few communications between his forces and Cairo, so with a gradual reduction
in leave tickets, he severed all communication and prevented news of his plans leaking out
into enemy hands. Or anyone’s hands. Nobody except a close inner circle knew what he was
doing, to the point that even Prime Minister Churchill didn’t know, until he demanded
to be told. When he was told of the plans, he seemed quite impressed, despite the size
of the enemy force that faced them. But they weren’t Wavell’s plans. They
were O’Connor’s. O’Connor sent the plans for Operation Compass to Wavell, who accepted
them on November 2nd, 1940. However, Wavell wanted a 5 day raid and then a withdrawal
back to Mersa Matruh. O’Connor was more ambitious. If I can use a metaphor, what he
planned was left-hand punch, similar to that used in France during the summer. Strike to
the coast, surround and destroy the enemy. Then push onwards to victory. The operation
was designed to suit the new ‘I’ tanks. If the plan failed, a large portion of the tanks
would have to be left behind. So there was a lot of daner in this plan. But how could this left-punch succeed? On
the opposite side of the wire, the Italians are happy to wait. Tenth Army had ten divisions.
Six of them were in Egypt. One Libyan and one Metropolitan division were at the front
around Sidi Barrani, under the command of General Gallina. At a camp at Nibeiwa sat
most of the Italian armour in 10th Army. This was an ad-hoc group known as the Malletti
group, after it’s commander General Malletti. The Italian armour mainly consisted of all
the M11/39 tanks in Libya as well as a few other models. Behind them all were three more
divisions under Generals Bergonzoli, Berti and Amico. All these divisions were dug into
the sands, protected by minefields and supported by hospitals, sleeping quarters and a host
of other lavish camps. The generals hugged the coast, waiting for supplies to slowly
trickle in, and waiting for the road linking Sollum to Sidi Barrani to be finished. Six Italian divisions. A hundred thousand
men. Facing that force are two British divisions, little over thirty thousand men in total.
But despite this numerical superiority, O’Connor notices that the Italians are making several
mistakes. The Italians believed the British were solely on the defensive, like they had
been in France. Their intelligence gathering also lacked accuracy, meaning they had absolutely
no idea about what their enemy were doing. They aren’t patrolling as often as the British,
who constantly move into the desert and scout out Italian positions. The result is that
the British are well aware of the disposition of the Italian forces. Scouts who go to the
area between Nibeiwa and Sofafi make no contact with the enemy. No contact. There’s a gap
in the lines! So on 7th December, 1940 the British begin
to move. The British armoured force moves from Mersa Matruh and strike into the Sofafi-Nibeiwa
gap. The 7th Armoured forms the spearhead of the attack followed by 4th Indian Division,
and their plan is to cut north, reach the coast at Buq Buq, and cut the Italian troops in two. Indian troops were reinforced
by tanks from 7th Armoured. Also happy to take part in a what was deemed a “novel” operation,
the Indians were confident and enthusiastic after their training exercises. Along the
coast, a force known as the ‘Selby Force’, formed by garrison units and borrowed tanks
from 7th Armoured aims to strike at Maktila. Italian intelligence was accurate on the 8th
at least, spotting the throng of British vehicles in the desert. But the Italians came to the
wrong conclusion that the British were reinforcing a defense. The official history states that
“The British attempt at strategic deception was therefore successful.” On the 8th of December,
they enter the gap, and with the new infantry tanks they’d only just received, on the
9th the battle begins as they slice into the rear of the Italian camp at Nibeiwa. The British are at the rear of the Nibeiwa
camp by around 7am. This area wasn’t mined, like the front of the camp was, and so after
a quick artillery bombardment from the South, the Matildas rolled into the North-West corner
of the camp at 7:15. The entire Italian armoured force is caught warming their engines
up at breakfast and essentially wiped out in minutes by the Matilda tanks, who rolled
on further into the camp. The Italian tanks have no effective counter to the heavy armour
of the Matildas, and the Italian infantry had even less. Machineguns and grenades were
used in vain to try and stop the assault, and artillery fired at the Matildas until
the last gun was taken out. With Scottish and Indian infantry pushing through the camp
supported by Bren carriers, by 10:40 the Maletti Group disintegrates. Maletti himself is killed
firing a machine-gun whilst wearing his pyjamas. 2000 Italian and Libyan prisoners are taken
at Nibeiwa alone, and the Italians in Libya are left without any of their M11/39 tanks
at all. To the North, Maktila is assaulted by the
Selby Force but not before a quick but heavy bombardment from the Royal Navy, by the gunboat
Aphis and the monitor H.M.S. Terror. Terror packed twin 15-inch and eight 4-inch guns
which packed a heavy punch. The Italian morale breaks and they withdraw, unfortunately managing
to escape to the West despite attempts by Selby to cut them off. But another armoured
force of 7th Armoured – 4th Armoured Brigade, reaches the coast between Buq Buq and Sidi
Barrani, placing the Italians in a hopeless situation. After Nibeiwa, the British lose
six tanks as they move to Tummars West, but are ready to attack it in the afternoon. Artillery
starts at 12 and pounds the Italian positions. At 1, the tanks advance and break through
the perimeter with ease. But surprisingly there’s more opposition at Tummars West
than there was at Maktila, despite being an infantry unit and thus hopelessly outgunned
by the Matilda tanks. Pounded by artillery and smashed by the tanks, Tummars West resists
for longer than Maktila did but is finally overwhelmed by about 4pm, with another 2000
Italian prisoners taken by the British. As night falls, the Italians at Sofafi-Rabia,
fearing another blow, fall back towards the Mamarica Division near the Libyan border.
Then at dawn on the 10th of December, the British force the surrender of Tummars East,
and move on towards Sidi Barrani. Sidi Barrani is bombarded by the Ladybird gunboat to further
pummel the Italians into submission which helped break Italian morale. Another camp
surrenders and Sidi Barrani is captured before night falls on the 10th, leaving the 1st and
2nd Libyan Divisions and the 4th Blackshirt Division trapped between Sidi Barrani and
the Selby Force. The Libyan forces surrender by 4pm on the 11th, and the 4th Blackshirt
Division falls by nightfall with more prisoners taken. Three days into the offensive and O’Connor
had achieved a decisive victory. Egypt was now safe from Italian aggression, two Italian
Corps had been crushed, thirty-eight thousand prisoners taken, and plenty of tanks, equipment
and even four generals were now in British hands. All this at a cost of 624 British total
losses. The Battle of Sidi Barrani ends in an Italian disaster. On the 12th, with victory
assured, O’Connor gets a nasty surprise. Not from the Italians, but from General Wavell.
The British 4th Indian Division is to be swapped for the 6th Australian Infantry Division which
won’t arrive until the 14th. Oh great, half of O’Connor’s
force is taken from him during the middle of a major attack. The Indian Division is
sent to East Africa to fight the Italians there, leaving O’Connor’s force without
a good portion of infantry during this crucial time. Now, at this juncture, O’Connor had a choice.
With only the 7th Armoured Division and the Selby Force available, was he really in a
position to continue the attack? He could withdraw to Mersa Matruh again. Afterall,
his ammunition supplies would only give him a few more days worth of heavy fighting, and
he didn’t have the tanks to mount a major campaign in the desert. But if he did withdraw,
that would give the initiative back to the Italians, who on paper still outnumbered him
massively with a few fresh divisions. No, he was determined to pursue the Italians,
and so the British advanced. Unfortunately, the loss of nearly half the British units
gave Graziani time to reinforce his defences at Bardia. Mussolini issued direct orders
to the garrison at Bardia, which was under direct command by General Bergonzoli, also
known as ‘Electric Whiskers’, that they were to defend Bardia to the last. Bergonzoli’s
reply was ‘In Bardia we are and here we stay.’ Delays in the British attacks, which
we’ll cover shortly, highlighted to Graziani that the British were suffering from supply
shortages. Knowing this, he wanted to pull all units back to Tobruk to mount an effective
defence there. But Mussolini wouldn’t have it. The Italians would stand at Bardia. So as the Indians withdraw, 7th Armoured continue
their attack to the West. Operation Compass does not stop at the Battle of Sidi Barrani,
but continues West. And the dynamics change. It’s no longer a set piece battle, and O’Connor
couldn’t plan this far ahead. Yet O’Connor will prove once again just how good a commander
he was. 7th Armoured reaches Buq Buq, where the Catanazaro
Division blunts their movement with heavy artillery fire. But it’s only a slight set-back.
The Italians are simply outflanked from both sides and are forced to flee once more, with
British tanks mopping up stragglers as they go. The H.M.S. Terror reaches Bardia on the 14th
and began to pound Italian defences, which she would continue to smash for the next three
days. The Aphis actually entered the harbour and the Terror reported seeing black smoke
rolling out of the harbour as the Aphis did it’s work. After this the two ships retreated
along the coast to safety. But from the 14th onwards, the RAF also started to bomb Bardia
quite heavily. In the meantime, O’Connor realises that the 45,000 Italians in Bardia,
surrounded by 29km of fortifications and an anti-tank ditch, weren’t going to surrender
without a fight and so places 7th Armoured between the port and the West, preventing
Italian reinforcements coming from Tobruk. Then he waits for the 6th Australian Division
to arrive. But the Australians wouldn’t be ready for
an attack before January, meaning vital time was lost in the wake of the victory at Sidi
Barrani. This all stems from Wavell’s decision to withdraw the 4th Indian Division which
he had sent to fight in Ethiopia. The Australians weren’t equipped, were inexperienced at
this point, and were only allowed to fire one practice round before being sent off into
action. They would prove themselves in the coming battles, but at the time they were
simply not prepared for battle. Equipment slowly trickled in especially after the port
of Sollum was captured on the 16th of December. But Sollum wasn’t a major harbour and, despite
the addition of 80 captured Italian trucks to help the supply situation, the British
knew they couldn’t fully support the Australians at this time. Water was a huge problem, and
the Terror, as well as the other Royal Navy ships, had to deliver water straight to Sollum
in order to alleviate the shortage. Water remained scarce until sources at Buq Buq,
Sidi Barrani and Fort Capuzzo were established. This allowed more reinforcements to enter
the area, which meant the attack on Bardia could begin soon. Australian Major-General Iven Giffard Mackay
arrived at the Sollum area on the 21st and set about studying the ground. The 16th Australian
Infantry Brigade took up positions to the West of Bardia, south of the Bardia-Tobruk
road. They patrolled the area and examined the Italian fortifications, under occasional
fire from Italian guns. The Italians though didn’t mount their own patrols, although
they were a bit more sensitive of the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, who took up positions
to the South of Bardia. It seemed to Mackay that the main defences seemed to be in the
south, which they were, and it was understood now that five Italian divisions were in Bardia
at this time, vs the one Australian Division and a little tank support from the British.
Mackay therefore decided to mount his attack on the Western side of the Bardia defences,
thinking a breakthrough here would cut the defences in half and isolate the Italian guns.
The ground was also good for the Matilda tanks as it placed them on open ground on a slight
rise which would maximise observation. The only issue would be that the anti-tank ditches
and mines would have to be cleared for the tanks, so the Australian infantry would have
to go in first. At 5:30am on 3rd of January 1941, the attack
on Bardia began with a concentrate artillery barrage on a half mile of Italian defences
immediately in front of the Australian 16th Brigade. Advancing 1000 yards, engineers blew
holes in the wire with Bangalores and secured positions across the anti-tank ditch. Using
trench tools, they created two crossing places for the tanks, and removed a good chunk of
the mines in the area, all with an hour of the attack. At 7am the Matildas rolled forwards.
Sporadic fighting began, with tanks leading infantry and infantry leading tanks depending
on the situation, including a small counter attack by six Italian tanks, but leading elements
reached the Bardia-Capuzzo road and the 16th Brigade could claim to have secured almost
all its objectives by 8:30am on day one. A short but heavy naval bombardment began at
8:10am, with the battleships Warspite, Valiant and Barham, supported by seven destroyers,
blasting the northern area of the Bardia defences. The Terror and more gunboats kept up a stream
of fire for several hours. But by this point 8,000 prisoners had been taken. 8,000. The
Australian casualties were no where near that, although they did lose a couple of platoons
of infantry and some Crusader tanks. At 11:30 the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade
attacked the southern part of the Bardia defences. Now, this attack didn’t go quite as well
as that in the north, with accurate Italian artillery fire pinning troops to the sand
and progress was slow. However, progress was made and by the end of the day, they’d reached
the Switch line. On the second day, 19th Australian Infantry Brigade moved up behind the 16th
and advanced into the perimeter. Their attack was so rapid that the Italians didn’t even
have time to destroy the port facilities, and by the end of the day, thousands of Italian
prisoners were taken and the only areas of resistance left were in the north and southern
areas of the battlefield, which were quickly overrun on the third and final day. In three days, over 40,000 Italians were either
killed, wounded, missing or captured, although General Bergonzoli managed to escape with
around 120 men. The Australians lost less than 500 men. Yes. The Australians dealt 80
times as many casualties to the Italians as the Italians did to them. Unbelieveable. Before the fall of Bardia, 7th Armoured was
on the move. Unopposed, they reached El Adem by the 5th and were moving to cut Tobruk off
at the coast which they complete by the 9th. The Australians came up later, but the same
thing happens again. Supply becomes an issue. The British have to battle sandstorms and
use captured trucks in order to get supplies through to the Tobruk area. This delayed the
start of the attack on Tobruk for a couple weeks, allowing the 25,000 man Italian garrison
to dig in. General Pitassi Mannella commanded Tobruk.
Surrounded and with their positions known to the British,
Mannella could do little but hope to hold the British at Tobruk for reinforcements to
arrive from the West. The 61st Sirte Division, two additional battalions and a handful of
tanks was all he had to hold the port. So basically, he had half the number of men that
Bergonzoli had had at Bardia and was expected to hold a front twice as long. But the British had their own problems. They
needed to capture Tobruk harbour intact before the Italians could destroy the facilities,
otherwise supply would become a huge issue. Mackay was once again in charge of
the attack on Tobruk, with his Australians and Matilda tanks ready to move. It was going
to be a similar sort of attack to that at Bardia, and it was feared that the Italians
would be better prepared for the attack. Worse, 7th Armoured had only 69 cruiser tanks and
around 120 light tanks left with which to advance once Tobruk had fallen, which was
concerning considering the Italians had more forces in the Derna and Mechili areas, the
latter had an armoured force of unknown strength. But there was no choice, an attack was to
be made on Tobruk, and once it fell, 7th Armoured was to advance westwards. It was now just
a matter of how well the Italians did at defending themselves. In the early morning of the 21st of January,
Wellington bombers dropped their payloads onto the Tobruk area. The Terror and two gunboats
bombarded the inner defences as the Royal Navy prepared to take on the Italian San Giorgio
cruiser that waited in the harbour. At 5:40, artillery pounded the Italian positions in
the south eastern part of the Italian lines and the Australian infantry went forwards.
Once again, engineers cleared the way and the Matildas were behind enemy lines within
about an hour. There was now a mile wide gap in the lines and the Australians were tackling
numerous Italian positions, some which resisted well, other that didn’t. In the afternoon
to the left of the breakthrough, an artillery barrage and a counter-attack by Italian infantry
supported by seven tanks hit a Australian battalion, but were repulsed quickly. Throughout
the day, Blenheims of the RAF strafed enemy positions in the area and by nightfall the
forts of Solaro and Pilastrino were taken. Mackay ordered a halt to the day’s fighting,
but when the attacks resumed the next day, they were greeted by thousands of Italian
prisoners. 61st Sirte Division surrendered with its commander, Major-General Mura, and
the garrison at Tobruk, including Admiral Vietina and the Italian naval units there,
surrendered also. 25,000 prisoners were taken, for just 400 Allied casualties. Tobruk harbour
fell into British hands and, despite some damage and a sunken Italian cruiser in the
harbour, it was fully operational by the 24th. 7th Armoured advanced as planned to the west
from the 21st onwards. Now, the Italians had a few forces in the area. The understrength
60th Sabratha Division was at Derna, the 17th Pavia Division was at Cyrene and the 27th
Brescia Division was at Slonta. But most importantly, at Mechili was an Italian armoured brigade
under the command of General Balbini. The British didn’t know much about the armoured
brigade, it consisting of Medium Italian tank units backed up by a strong artillery presence.
But O’Connor wanted to tackle it quickly as it was the main threat to British forces. On the 24th, with Tobruk under Australian
control, the Australians pushed north towards Derna. This meant that 7th Armoured Brigade
could move south to where 4th Armoured Brigade was and work together to hit the Italian Armoured
force at Mechili. Another tank vs tank action saw losses to both sides, and despite O’Connor’s
best intentions, the Balbini tank force managed to withdraw to Slonta over the next few days.
This was concerning to O’Connor, but this left Graziani in a bad position. Most of his
forces were in the north, in the Cyrenaica area and could easily be outflanked by the
British. On the 1st of February, he told Mussolini that he was going to withdraw and spare the
remainder of 10th Army from destruction. This was a sound move, as the British had only
around 50 tanks left at this point, and would suffer from supply issues if they advanced
too far into Libya. This would then leave the Italians in a better position to counter-attack
later. O’Connor wasn’t happy that the Italian
armour had got away. Resistance was strong moving north from Mechili and he knew the
Italians were now concentrated, giving them the best possibilities of blunting his attacks.
But he also saw a great opportunity present itself. The plan he came up with was to continue
to pursue the Italians with the Australian Division, minus one brigade, whilst 7th Armoured,
with that other Australian brigade, would move across the desert to Msus. From Msus
he could either strike north to Benghazi, or if the Italians moved south to withdraw
completely, he could cut them off at the coast. All it required was reinforcements from 2nd
Armoured Division which were expected by the 9th of February, and the stockpiling of enough
supplies to last his forces the 150 miles through desert not previously moved over.
He therefore submitted his plans to General Wavell on the 31st of January, and Wavell
accepted them the next day. By February 2nd though, reports started coming
in that the Italians were retreating quicker than expected, with movement from Berta to
Barce being detected by the RAF. O’Connor realised that the Italians were withdrawing
on a much larger scale than hoped a few days earlier and now faced a dilemma. He could
continue to wait for reinforcements and supplies, or he could launch his Msus advance now with
the delicate forces he had at hand. He knew he could restock the 7th Armoured by the 4th,
and supply it with an additional convoy a few days later. But he also knew that if this
wasn’t enough to get him across 150 miles and fight the Italians, then 7th Armoured
would be doomed. O’Connor accepted the consequences and launched
his attack, and straight away it bogged down. The first fifty miles of desert was littered
with rocks and steep wadis, but by the afternoon of the 4th part of the division reached Msus.
By the 5th, 7th Armoured was east of Msus and ready to move to the coast. To the North,
the Australians reached Cyrene by the evening of the 4th and pressed forwards to Benghazi
by the evening of the 5th. The Italians had already withdrawn past Benghazi and were now
clearly heading south towards El Agheila. Now, O’Connor’s forces were racing at
all different speeds. He therefore ordered that a force of wheeled units should advance
ahead of the main force to cut the enemy’s path of retreat. He also decided not to aim
towards Soluch, but to go to Antelate, which was south west of Msus. On the 5th, the wheeled
force, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Combe and was thus known as the Combe Force, reached
Antelat in the early morning. Patrols spotted the Italian column moving south down the road
near Beda Fomm. British anti-tank guns blasted the Italians, causing confusion. And part
of Combe’s Force established itself on the main road by around 12 noon. The Italians
reached this point at 12:30, meaning the British had only just beaten the Italians to this
point by a mere 30 minutes. Nethertheless, the Combe Force fought off repeated Italian
attempts to break through their position, despite the fact that Combe only had a very
small unit at his disposal. The Italian columns kept piling up, and their attempts to break
out went in piecemeal, which meant the British were able to repulse them individually. By mid afternoon, 4th Armoured, which had
been given most of the tank units of 7th Armoured to strengthen it up as much as possible, moved
from Antelat towards Beda Fomm. They slammed into the flank of the Italian forces in two
places. The Italians were caught in place and by dusk, a large portion of the road was
blocked by destroyed Italian vehicles. These were the general positions of the units
on the morning of the 6th of February 1940. 7th Armoured was at Antelat, the Support Group was engaging the fort at Sceleidima, Combe’s Force was in the
south near Sidi Saleh, and 4th Armoured was at Beda Fomm. 4th Armoured consisted of the
2nd Royal Tank Regiment, which was on ‘The Pimple’ – a hillock – to the south, and
had nineteen cruisers and seven light tanks. The 7th Hussars had just one cruiser and twenty
light tanks, and was located slightly further north. 1st Royal Tank Regiment with 11 cruisers
was back at Msus in desperate need or refueling. Here’s what happened next. The Italians came forwards throughout the
morning in groups, with their tanks and infantry engaged by 4th Armoured, who refused to let
them escape. The cruisers battered the Italian tanks as the light tanks engaged the infantry
and other vehicles when they could. Confusion reigned in the Italian ranks, with some units
attempted to break out towards the dunes to the west. They were destroyed. By noon, forty
Italian medium tanks were accounted for, but another fifty roamed around. This was vs the
15 cruisers the British had left. 1st Royal Tank Regiment arrived mid afternoon to find
that the Pimple had been lost to the Italians. 30 Italian tanks and a host of infantry and
vehicles moved south towards Combe’s force. 2nd Royal Tank Regiment succeeded in retaking
the Pimple to prevent more Italians getting through, and 1st Royal Tank Regiment prevented
a column of vehicles from breaking out towards Beda Fomm, but Combe’s Force was now in
trouble. Combe Force hit the oncoming Italians with
everything they had, including nine Bofors guns, littering the field with vehicles of
all shapes and sizes. Most were repulsed or forced to surrender, but four tanks and a
small portion of vehicles did manage to break through Combe’s lines and flee south. On the 7th, the last gasp for freedom by the
Italians was made. 30 tanks and a bunch more infantry moved south to Combe’s Force. Firing
at point blank range, Combe’s anti-tank guns destroyed tank after tank, and somehow
the Force held the line, but it was a close call. Italian white flags started to appear.
And by about 9am, it was all over. 25,000 Italians were captured. Bergonzoli,
General Tellera (newly appointed commander of 10th Army) and pretty much the whole of
10th Army were now prisoners of war. And that was just at Beda Fomm. If we look at the entire campaign so far,
we can see the British and Commonwealth forces achieved a stunning victory. 130,000 Italians
were captured; 180 medium tanks were destroyed as were 200 light tanks; and 845 field guns
were captured or destroyed too. 10 enemy divisions were wiped out, for the loss of 500 killed,
1300 wounded and 55 missing. O’Connor had achieved nothing short of a decisive victory.
Egypt was safe, the Italians were thoroughly beaten in North Africa and the situation looked stable. Not bad for an Operation that was mounted at first as a raid. Armies in battles make mistakes. The British
make plenty of mistakes during Compass. Lessons were learnt about using wireless to reduce the
problems of command over a large battlefield. The major set back of this campaign was the
withdrawal of 4th Indian, which was a surprise and shock to O’Connor who didn’t know about
the transfer. O’Connor was of the opinion that nobody expected a British victory in
the Western Desert, and when it came they weren’t willing to alter their plans, with
the result that surprise was lost. This loss of surprise can be blamed on General Wavell,
who was in command of all forces in the Middle East. But ultimately the British won the day,
so the question is, why did the Italians lose when they were technically superior on paper? There are two arguments for the Italian failure.
The first is mainly that the Italians were unprepared, and didn’t have the stomach
for fighting. The British official history concludes the higher Italian commanders “had little
or no idea of fighting a battle in desert conditions, and that on the whole the junior
leaders and men were apt to lose heart very quickly.” Italian intelligence was often exaggerated
and ignored, they didn’t patrol and they relied heavily on colonial troops, who simply
didn’t want to be there let alone fight. The equipment the Italians had was obsolete.
They actually had 54 types of artillery pieces, a good portion of which were from World War
1, and many were vastly out of date, which increased the already strained logistical
issues they had because they had to ship many different types of shells through the desert
for all the different types of guns. Their tanks were awful, the argument says. They
simply weren’t capable of facing British tanks, especially the Matilda tanks, and so
were overwhelmed. Many books on this subject, especially the British ones, come to the conclusion
that the Italian Army in 1940/41 was a complete joke. But this isn’t entirely the case.
In fact, the reason for the poor intelligence was because the Italian infantry – ill trained
and lead by poorly trained officers – wasn’t prepared for war. That’s not a reflection
of the Italians but a reflection of the fact that Mussolini sent his nation to war when
it simply wasn’t ready for it. So this argument, with can be summed up by saying
the Italians weren’t prepared for war, is one of the arguments for the failure of the
Italians during Compass. The second argument is that Graziani was responsible
for the Italian failure. Graziani had experience in Ethiopia. He had developed the War of Rapid
Decision doctrine, Italy’s armoured warfare doctrine. Yet, the Italians didn’t have
an armoured division during Compass. They actually had more tanks than the British,
but didn’t group them together, and the result was that the British could overwhelm
the Italian tanks in small penny-packets time and time again. Major Howard R.Christie, in
his study of the Italian 10th Army at this time, comes to the conclusion that had Graziani
reorganised his forces and deployed the doctrine, the British wouldn’t have stopped them before
reaching the Nile. The primary reason that the Italians lost this battle wasn’t because
the Italians were cowards or because of a lack of equipment or anything else, it was
mainly because Graziani decided to conquer Egypt with an infantry mass, rather than reform
his force into a modern mobile armoured group. That is the reason they failed. And no one
can excuse Graziani. It was he that lead his Army to disaster. So what do you think? Was it more that the
Italians were ill-prepared for war, or was it entirely Graziani’s fault? Let me know
in the comments below. The reality is that the reason the British
were able to overwhelm the Italian tanks was because in most cases they outnumbered them.
Yes, the Matilda was a special case, but the rest of the British tanks were similar to
the Italian ones at this stage in the war. In the tank on tank engagements in the first
few days of the war, the Italians didn’t come off that much worse than the British.
The reason they lost out was because they were deployed in small groups and overwhelmed
by concentrated British tank attacks. The Matilda was also incredibly powerful, but
they didn’t appear until Operation Compass began. They weren’t around during Operation
E. The reason Italy failed to defeat the British prior to Compass was because Graziani didn’t
reorganise his forces and integrate his very own armoured warfare doctrine, that he had
come up with! If he had concentrated his armoured forces and motorised his infantry, which he
could have done, it may have been a different story. Graziani must take the majority of
the blame for the failure of the Italian Army during this stage of the campaign. Of course, praise should also go to Generals
Wavell, O’Connor and the Australian commander Mackay for their role in breaking the sieges
of Bardia and Tobruk. And taking thousands of Italian prisoners. These three generals, as well as the well trained men they lead, were the reason Operation Compass succeeded. Here are the books I’ve used for this documentary
– at first glance there doesn’t appear to be a lot of books on this list. Actually this
is a good portion of the books written on Compass. Everyone and their mother has written
about El Alamein, but nobody seems to care about Compass. So if you have any recommendations
for books on this battle please let us know in the comments below, I’m interested to
see what you come up with. O’Connor stated later that his plan for
Sidi Barrani was ‘sound, a bit complicated perhaps’. He clearly hasn’t seen the plan
for Operation Market Garden, which you can see here. Now THAT was complicated! Actually
he did see the plans, as he was in command of VIII Corps which protected the flank of
XXX Corps during the Operation. We’ll no doubt be coming back to revisit O’Connor
in the future so if you add me on twitter @TIKhistory you’ll get constant updates
on when I’m going to upload new episodes and glimpses of the things I’m working on
behind the scenes. Thanks for watching, thanks for subscribing, bye for now.